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Abstract 
 
The ‘limbo argument’ suggests that when the chances of removing a refused asylum seeker are 
remote or irrational, they should be given some form of temporary permission to remain in 
order to contribute towards society. This argument has been largely rejected and the current 
system of destitution for refused asylum seekers who cannot be removed, remains. This work 
draws a parallel between being in ‘limbo’ and being de facto stateless. It argues that being de 
facto stateless is a broad term, and goes on to analyse how the European Court of Human Rights 
and the European Court of Justice have given increased protection to de facto statelessness 
people. This work then goes on to apply such protection to refused asylum seekers who are in 
‘limbo’, suggesting how such protection can operate in domestic law, and rejecting counter-
arguments as to the limbo arguments viability, and flawed policy arguments.   
 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
 
The Limbo argument: 
 
There may come a time when the prospects of the person ever being able safely to return, 
whether voluntarily or compulsorily, are so remote that it would irrational to deny him the 
status which would enable him to make a proper contribution to the community here…1 
 
The time for the ‘limbo argument’ has come; it should be applicable in UK courts. With the 
influence of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions, European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) rulings and the UK’s international obligations, it is time to consider the view that the 
inability to safely return migrants constitutes a form of de facto statelessness; this statelessness 
should then grant leave to remain for the individual until they can be safely and lawfully 
returned. The limbo argument is analogous to the de facto stateless protection offered by the 
above courts, and allows a domestic application of such rulings.    
 
Lady Hale’s one paragraph obiter statement, at the start of this work, has been termed 
‘the limbo argument’ to reflect the fact that many individuals who cannot be deported live in a 
state of anticipation for their removal, and whilst in this position do not have full rights. It has 
led to arguments that some rights should be available for those granted ‘temporary admission, 
who have no affirmative right to remain in this country, but cannot, for particular, reasons be 
removed.’2 Such views has been rejected in UK courts, 3 and seen as not a ‘live question’.4 This 
work will argue that the limbo argument does bind the UK courts, as an effect of the UK’s 
obligation to take into account ECtHR rulings and being bound by ECJ decisions, and applies 
to a wide category of peoples who have been given temporary admission, namely those who 
are ‘de facto stateless’, that is, stateless in fact rather than law (de jure). The practical 
consequence of the application of this argument is that those who are de facto stateless should 
be given leave to remain, until they are no longer de facto stateless. 
In this work one group of de facto stateless persons will be studied; refused asylum 
seekers.5 Such persons only have access to minimum rights, such as healthcare, and are refused 
many more rights such as the right to housing, benefits, and to employment, 6 often leading to 
destitution.7 It must be noted other groups of persons fall into the category of de facto stateless 
                                                          
1 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Khadir, [2005] UKHL 39, [Lady Hale], [4]. 
2 MS, AR & FW v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009] EWCA Civ 1310, [Sedly] [2]. 
3 See also Lord Doherty, Judicial Review of a decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department dated 
10 July 2013, [2014] CSOH 63, in the Scottish Courts. 
4 Abdullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 42, [Beatson], [29]. 
5 The number of Asylum Seekers who have had their grant rejected totalled to 10,994 people in 2013, Home 
Office, ‘Asylum data tables immigration statistics April to June 2014’, Vol. 1, AS 05, ‘Asylum applications and 
initial decisions for main applicants by sex and country of nationality’ in Tables for Immigration Statistics: April 
to June 2014,[2014].      
6 See See H. Crawley, J. Hemmings and N. Price, ‘Coping with Destitution Survival and livelihood strategies of 
refused asylum seekers living in the UK’, Centre for Migration Policy Research (CMPR), Swansea University 
(2011), https://stillhumanstillhere.files.wordpress.com/2009/01/oxfam_coping_with_destitution.pdf  [accessed 
05 March 2016], pp. 8-9. 
7 No centralised data exists as to how many are destitute, however some charities have predicted 30,000- 50,000 
may currently be in such a situation, see Leicester Refugee and Asylum Seekers 
Voluntary Sector Forum, Destitution in the asylum system in Leicester, (2009), 
https://stillhumanstillhere.files.wordpress.com/2009/06/destitutionintheasylumsystem.pdf [accessed 09 April 
2016], p. 13. 
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persons, namely terrorists who have had their nationality stripped from them,8 which has been 
analysed in depth elsewhere.9   
 
A refused asylum seeker is a migrant who has applied for asylum, has been rejected, 
and has exhausted all appeals. In theory, refused asylum seekers are liable to be detained or 
removed to their country of origin when it is convenient for the State to do so.10 However, 
many refused asylum seekers are not returned for long periods, often because if deported back 
to their home State they may face a ‘real risk’ of suffering degrading treatment, breaching the 
UK’s Article 3 obligations under the ECHR.11 They are then without the full rights of a British 
citizen, yet cannot be deported until their return destination is deemed safe. Without 
government support or a means to work, refused asylum seekers are often destitute, often 
cannot stop their destitution, and yet cannot be deported for years or sometimes decades.12 
During this time their original nationality counts for very little, as most cannot return to their 
country or origin. Thus from the period these people are refused asylum in the UK until they 
are to be deported, they are in ‘limbo’.13  
 
The UK was chosen for an in-depth study as it is part of the ECtHR, the EU, is a party 
to the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954),14 the Convention of the 
Reduction of Statelessness (1961),15  and also has its own individual statelessness procedures.16 
This allows an analysis at three levels, international, regional and domestic, and contributes to 
fields of scholarship including; the study of statelessness, constitutional law by its examination 
of ECtHR and ECJ rulings on the UK, and is the first study of its kind to study in-depth the 
relationship between statelessness and the limbo argument. The practical ramifications of the 
suggestions in this work, if adopted, will permit refused asylum seekers leave to remain, 
allowing rights such as housing and the right to work, and reducing destitution. This solution 
to destitution, and allowing rights for refused asylum seekers, is better than the current 
available options for such people.  
                                                          
8 27 people since 2010, T. May, ‘Home Secretary Theresa May on counter-terrorism’, Royal United Services 
Institute, Whitehall, London, 24th Nov 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-theresa-
may-on-counter-terrorism [accessed 05 March 2016] [25]. 
9 See G. Goodwin-Gill,  ‘Deprivation of Citizenship resulting in Statelessness and its Implications in International 
Law’, Opinion, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1086878/guy-s-goodwin-gill-legal-opinion-on-
deprivation.pdf [accessed 15 April 2016]. 
10 Immigration Act, 2014 s.1(1). 
11 As established in Chahal v. United Kingdom [1996], 23 EHRR 413. 
12 See H. Lewis, ‘Still destitute: A worsening problem for refused asylum seekers’, (2009), Joseph Rowntree 
Trust, 
http://www.jrct.org.uk/userfiles/documents/Still%20destitute%20(2009%20full%20research%20report).pdf 
[accessed 29 April 2016], p. 18. 
13 British Red Cross, Not gone, but forgotten: The urgent need for a more humane asylum system, (2010), 
http://www.redcross.org.uk/About-us/Our-advocacy-
work/~/media/BritishRedCross/Documents/About%20us/Not%20gone%20but%20forgotten%20destitution%20
report.pdf [accessed 09 April 2016], p. 9. 
14 Convention relating to the status of Stateless persons, 1954, ratified on 16/04/1959 with reservations based 
around right to remove if one is a threat to national security, see United Nations, Treaty Collection, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en  [accessed 10 March 2016].  
15 Convention of the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, ratified on the 29/03/1966 with reservations based around 
rejection of nationality if one has continued assistance from another state, or if one acts against the vital interests 
of the UK, see United Nations, Treaty Collection, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-4&chapter=5&lang=en [accessed 
10 March 2016].   
16 Immigration Rules, Part 14: Stateless Person. 
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The first part of this work will examine the theoretical underpinnings of statelessness, 
the division of this concept into de jure and de facto, and the effects international law has on 
this area of study. The second section will make the case that ECtHR and ECJ decisions have 
increased protection for de facto stateless people and will consider their impact on the UK legal 
system. The third part of this work will detail how the limbo argument could operate, will 
rebuke criticisms of it, and will argue it is the best case in order to reduce the destitution of 
asylum seekers. Finally, in the fourth section, this work will consider the effect the limbo 
argument would have if applied, rebutting arguments such as the ‘pull’ factor and suggesting 
the economy itself may benefit. 
 
1. Theoretical Underpinnings  
 
1.1 The Limbo Argument in the UK 
To understand this argument, one must first look at the case of Khadir. An argument was put 
forth in this case that living for several years with the prospect of removal and without ‘full 
rights’ such as to employment or full benefits, should allow the granting of the then status 
‘exceptional leave to enter’. The UK Supreme Court held that one could be ‘pending to remove’ 
‘so long as the Secretary of State remains intent upon removing the person and there is some 
prospect of achieving this.’17 The time between temporary admission and removal can be seen 
as ‘limbo’ in which Lady Hale suggested that if there was no remote possibility of return, those 
within limbo should be allowed to make a ‘proper contribution to society’. In MS and Others, 
Justice Sedley made explicit the link between being in limbo and Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, and argued that leave to remain may be granted on a case by 
case basis if Lady Hale’s conditions have been met.18 The link between limbo and Article 8 
was supported by such cases as Tekle in which denying the right to work for applicants who 
have to wait a ‘substantial’ period of time was deemed to breach Article 8.19  
 
However, Abdullah seems to pour cold water over Justice Sedley’s slight advance in 
developing the limbo argument by first claiming it is not a ‘live’ question, and then considering 
that if it were, it would depend on the ‘co-operation’ of the individual to obtain 
documentation.20 Lord Beatson, in Abdullah, also argued it may be analogous to the rules 
surrounding length of time in detention, such as excessive lengths of time in detention when 
there is little prospect of removal is unacceptable.21 
  
It is the task of this work to suggest that the time for the limbo argument has come by 
the ‘back door’. It will be argued that being in ‘limbo’ is the same as being de facto stateless, 
and the ECJ and ECtHR have given greater protection to those who are in such a position. 
Under the Human Rights Act (1998) the UK courts have to ‘take into account’ ECtHR 
decisions,22 and under the European Communities Act (1972),23 in conjunction with EU 
                                                          
17 Khadier [Lord Brown] [32]. 
18 MS, [Sedly] [27-30]. 
19 Tekle v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 3064 (Admin) [Blake] [40]. 
20 Abdullah [Beatson] [28-9]. 
21 Ibid, see R (MH) v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 1112 at [44] and [68(iii)] , [Richards LJ], where co-operation with 
the gathering of country of origin information is also a factor in determining detention length, as is excessive 
lengths of time in detention when there is little prospect of removal.   
22 Human Rights Act, 1998, s. 2(1), often the courts do take account of ECtHR rulings as if they do not applicants 
may appeal to the Strasbourg court, costing time and money and circumventing Parliament’s intent in wanting a 
UK appeal system for ECHR rights, hence the enactment of the HRA, see Home Office, Rights Brought Home: 
The Human Rights Bill (White Paper, CM 3782, 1997). 
23 European Communities Act, 1972, s.2(1).  
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treaties,24 the ECJ case laws are binding, although there is debate about this topic.25 Such courts 
having an influence on the UK, the UK Court should take ECtHR rulings into account and 
follow ECJ rulings in the development of de facto stateless protection.    
 
1.2 Statelessness and Nationality 
Statelessness as a theoretical concept links explicitly to nationality.26 The evolution of the 
concept owes much to Hannah Arendt and her argument that nationality allows the ‘right to 
have rights’, and that rather than the ‘inalienable’ status of rights, when one has no nationality 
‘he has lost the qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow man.’27 
Her argument is that States have created a system of rights and duties based around nationality 
in order to regulate borders, and thus when one does not have a nationality they are an 
‘anomaly.’28 This means they are outside of the system, unprotected and ‘right-less.’  
 
 Arendt wrote in the aftermath of the Second World War, when statelessness was 
rampant, with no legal protection to those who were in such a position. Since then, there have 
been two conventions to help protect those who are statelessness,29 and a division of who 
Arendt called stateless, into refugees and stateless, the former fleeing persecution.30 However 
Arendt’s critique has been argued to still exist, for instance Agier examines how stateless 
peoples are seen as not possessing any political existence, only a ‘biological one’ in relation to 
the basic humanitarian aid many receive.31 Such arguments point out that full ‘universal rights’ 
are still dependant on a State, and hence nationality is often a prerequisite.    
 
One reason for rights remaining dependant on nationality has a psychological 
undertone- because those who are stateless are seen as ‘the other’, 32 linking to a theory from 
Edward Said.33 This theory suggests that the ‘self’ (in this case, the national) seeks to portray 
the ‘other’ (the non-national) as the embodiment of everything the ‘self’ is not. This allows the 
‘self’ to better understand its own identity whilst attributing many negative characteristics to 
the ‘other’,34 allowing the ‘other’ to be seen as ‘troublesome’ and justifying legal actions 
against them.35  
  
                                                          
24 In particular see Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2007, s. 258. 
25 The debate around this topic which will not be included in this work for lack of space, see however G. 
Mikelsone, ‘The Binding force of the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union’, (2013), 
Jurisprudence, 20(2), pp. 469- 495. 
26 Defined in the Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955] ICJ 1, as ‘A legal bond having as its basis 
a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interest and sentiments, together with the existence 
of reciprocal rights and duties… ‘, p 23. 
27 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (3rd edn, Allen & Unwin, 1967), p.300. 
28 R. Jennings, ‘Some International Law Aspects of the Refugee Question’, (1939), British Year Book of 
International Law, Vol. 20, p. 110. 
29 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954 and The Convention of the Reduction of 
Statelessness, 1961. 
30 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 1(1). 
31 M. Agier, On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today, (Polity Press, 2008), p. 49. 
32 For instance see L. Kerber, ‘Toward a History of Statelessness in America’, (2005), American Quarterly Review, 
57, 727. 
33 E. Said, Orientalism, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). 
34 A. Padilla, ‘Social Cognition, Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Specification Strategies for coping with threat due to 
Prejudice and Discrimination’, in Willis- Esqueda, C., (ed.), Motivational Aspects of Prejudice and Racism, 
(Springer, 2008) p. 25. 
35 R. Jenkins, ‘Categorization: Identity, Social Process and Epistemology’, Current Sociology, (2000), Vol. 48, 
No. 7, p 19. 
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Thus the regulation of borders is in part to regulate the limit to the ‘space’ which the 
‘self’ claims. As a State’s main function is, arguably, to keep security within its borders and 
exclude the interference of other States, the existence of borders is understandable. 36 However, 
it can be argued that there are ‘multiple’ or ‘layered’ borders in the sense that groups may 
experience different barriers to the State at different points,37 for instance the availability of 
welfare.38 In the UK this does not apply to those who are nationals, their access to the State is 
largely unfettered.  
 
Combining the ideas of borders as a controlling mechanism and the concept of the 
‘other’, a system emerges that is often harsh. The key area such ‘harshness’ takes place is in 
the area of welfare. Stateless persons in the UK are refused access to much of the welfare state 
and refused asylum seekers in particular are not given access to social housing, unemployment 
benefits, education funding or allowed to work.39 These constrictions are part of a culture 
designed to make their stay ‘both unpleasant and short’,40 and to deter future arrivals from 
coming at all. One reason for this policy is to ensure that the State is not seen as too generous, 
or else they will be seen siding with ‘the other’, the non-national, against ‘the self’, the national.  
 
This leads into a discussion about the limits of nationality and nationality within a host 
State. As this concept endows one with rights, whilst non-nationals have lesser rights, it has 
been compared to a feudal class privilege system,41 and indeed by using nationality as an 
internal border the State is denying a class of people privileges.42 This is an area often 
understudied both in law and philosophy as there has been a preoccupation with ‘the ethics of 
admission’43 and an ignorance of the ethics of internal borders. This means the lack of ‘effective 
nationality’ has also been understudied, a point that is key to this work.44 
 
If nationality is ‘the right to have rights’, then for refused asylum seekers, returning 
back to a State where they fear they may face persecution, imprisonment or death would be to 
have all, or almost all, of their rights as unprotected. But in their host State, they cannot access 
the rights of citizens of the UK, making them ‘precarious residents’,45 as they have less 
protection than UK citizens and their residency in the State is under threat. Therefore, refused 
asylum seekers, in a state of limbo, have a nationality that is not effective, as returning to their 
home State would only lead to the abuse of their rights not the ‘right to have rights’. But they 
                                                          
36 See commentary over the Peace of Westphalia (1648), for instance J. Solana, ‘Securing Peace in Europe’, 
NATO, 12 Nov. 1998, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981112a.htm [accessed 03 March 2016]. 
37 A. Kesby ‘The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2007), 
27, p. 101. 
38 A. Kesby, ‘Internal borders and immigration control: new prospects and challenges’, European Human Rights 
Law Review, (2010), 2, pp. 176-191. 
39 See Salford City Council, Asylum seekers: some myths and truths..., (1 October 2015), Support and advice,  
https://www.salford.gov.uk/asylum-myths.htm  [accessed 24 March 2016]. 
40 P. Hynes, and R. Sales, ‘New Communities: Asylum Seekers and Dispersal’, in A. Bloch and J. Solomos, (eds.), 
Race and Ethnicity in the 21st Century, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 39. 
41 J. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, (OUP, 2013), p.137. 
42 See W. Wright, ‘Hannah Arendt and Enemy Combatants: New Implications of Statelessness.’ (2008), Annual 
meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 
http://research.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/3/8/0/5/p138056_index.html    [accessed 
15 March 2016],p. 22 for an analysis of the right to property. 
43 S. Parekh, ‘Beyond the ethics of admission: Stateless people, refugee camps and moral obligations’, (2014), 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 40(7) 645–663 
44 Different from the concept of ‘effective nationality’ in Nottebohm [21]which argued that an individual with two 
nationalities has ‘effective nationality’ with the State he had more links with. 
45 M. Gibney, ‘Precarious Residents: Migration Control, Membership and the Rights of Non-Citizens’, (2009), 
Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 19190, p.10 
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also suffer the limitation of rights, normally associated with nationality, in their host State. This 
is due to a strict control on internal state borders, motivated by a fear of the ‘other’. Thus 
refused asylum seekers are stateless as they do not have an effective nationality. 
 
1.3 Statelessness in International Law      
Arendt’s criticisms were partially addressed by the UN in the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Stateless Persons (1954).46 Appreciating that not all stateless people would be refugees, and 
so were in need of additional protection, this Convention itself was supposed to be a ‘gap 
filler’.47 Again, as a State’s sovereignty is largely reflected in its borders, the definition of one 
who is stateless and thus needs State protection was given a wide remit so that States 
themselves could decide it. Thus the following rather vague definition of a stateless person was 
given: 
 
For the purpose of this Convention, the term "stateless person" means a person who is not 
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.48 
 
 ‘Operation of its law’ immediately appeals to States as their law defines who can be 
stateless- such people would be ‘de jure stateless’. States can use the law to give a broad or 
narrow view of what is considered statelessness, but either way this status also requires 
evidence to ‘prove a negative’, an often impossible task that has wide discrepancies over what 
counts as confirmation of such statelessness. Some commentators for instance have argued a 
voting record can count as proof of nationality.49 However, the UNHCR itself admits one who 
may be considered stateless in one country, may not be in the next.50 This suggests 
disagreement over what does count as evidence, for instance a voting record can be largely 
informal in some States and not in others. Statelessness in practice therefore is incredibly hard 
to prove.  
  
1.4 De Facto Statelessness 
If one is found not to be stateless by the above definition, they may be seen as ‘de facto’ 
stateless.  There are different definitions for de facto statelessness, some arguing that it includes 
the individual having a nationality according to the law, but that nationality is ineffective or 
does not offer protection.51 However such a definition jars against Article 1 of the Convention 
as it ultimately allows one State to deem the nationality of another ‘ineffective’, an affront to 
the applicant’s State sovereignty.52 Apart from allowing States the use of value systems to 
judge legal matters, the strict legal separation between de jure and de facto stateless does not 
reflect the reality that both sects of people have similar protection needs and are indeed in 
similar circumstances, including inability to return.53 Some have argued that this means the 
definition has broken down and instead of such a definition ‘a more pragmatic approach may 
                                                          
46 Convention relating to the status of Stateless persons, (1954). 
47 See Pill LJ in Revenko v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 500.  
48 Article 1, Convention relating to the status of Stateless persons, (1954). 
49 P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, (Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1979), p. 
215. 
50 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, (2005),  
http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/nationality_en.pdf [accessed 03 March 2016], p. 20. 
51 See D. Weissbrodt, C. Collins, ‘The Human Rights of Stateless Persons’, (2006), Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 
28, No. 1, p. 251 and H. Massey, ‘UNHCR and de facto statelessness’, (2010), Legal and Protection Policy 
Research Series, LPPR/2010/01, http://www.unhcr.org/4bc2ddeb9.html  [accessed 05 March 2016] p. 61. 
52 A. Harvey, ‘Statelessness: The ‘de facto’ Statelessness Debate’, (2010), Immigration, Asylum and Nationality 
Law, Vol 24, No 3, p. 259 
53 Ibid, p.262. 
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be to identify different scenarios which amount to de facto statelessness…’54 It is in such a 
broad definition of statelessness that this work shall contribute, suggesting that the inability to 
return an individual amounts to de facto statelessness due to an ineffective nationality. 
(Resolution) 
  
The existence of de facto statelessness itself is a criticism of the international law 
surrounding this topic. Surely, if one is not stateless under the Convention, then they have a 
nationality and hence rights? But obviously this is not the case. The legal definition of 
statelessness does not reflect reality and so in effect de facto statelessness is the last crack 
through which people without effective rights and nationality fall. This can be seen as 
deliberate in order to limit the number of applicants who applied for such statelessness 
protection. Evidence of this can be seen by the rigorous rebuke against the suggestion that the 
Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), protects 
those who are de facto stateless. There is an argument that the Final Act implicitly protects 
those who are de facto stateless by recommending when a State ‘recognizes as valid the reasons 
for which a person has renounced the protection of the State of which he is a national, consider 
sympathetically the possibility of according to that person the treatment which the Convention 
accords to stateless persons.’55 Some international bodies associated this explicitly with those 
who are de facto stateless,56 although it must be pointed out ‘recommends’ and 
‘sympathetically’ are not legally obliging terms, despite the importance of the Convention 
itself. Even so this has been largely ignored by States who argue that ‘from the wording and 
the nature of the clause, the state is free to decide when the reasons are valid and, if so, whether 
it wishes to accord to a particular person… the rights under the Convention.’57 As there have 
only been sixteen successful applicants to be recognised as de jure stateless,58 there is clearly 
little appetite in the UK to be ‘sympathetic’ to such people potentially because they would be 
delivering the ‘other’ into their society, and so the internal borders are maintained.  
 
De facto statelessness covers a broad range of people and situations and any definition 
cannot include all people who are not de jure stateless. Thus, this work will view those that are 
not de jure stateless as de facto stateless. This broad remit allows refused asylum seekers within 
the de facto stateless field and attempts to be as inclusive as possible. Doing so attempts to stop 
what Ardent discussed over sixty years ago, the ignorance of statelessness by a lack of 
discussion about de facto statelessness, a ‘core concept’.59 The ultimate form of recognition for 
                                                          
54 The Equal Rights Trust, Legal Working Paper: The Protection of Stateless Persons in Detention under 
International Law, (2009), Project “Stateless Persons in Detention”, 
http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/ERT%20Legal%20Working%20Paper.pdf [accessed 05 
March 2016], p.6.  
55 UNHCR, Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Status of Stateless Persons, (1954), 
http://www.ehu.eus/ceinik/tratados%5C16TRATADOSSOBREREFUGIADOS%5C161RefugiadosApatridasyA
silo%5CTR1615ING.pdf [accessed 05 March 2016], p. 3. 
56 UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of 
stateless persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva, (January 1999), 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b3350.pdf [accessed 05 March 2016], p. 13 see also UNHCR and IPU, 
Nationality and statelessness  p. 25. 
57 N. Robinson, ‘Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation’, (1955), 
UNHCR, Geneva, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4785f03d2.pdf [accessed 05 March 2016], p. 12. 
58 Between 2013-4 783 people applied in the UK and 16 were granted statelessness, see  European Migration 
Network and European Commission, Ad-Hoc Query on recognition of stateless persons, Requested by LU EMN 
NCP on 26th February 2015, Compilation of 4th May 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-queries/ad-hoc-queries-
2015.675_lu_recognition_of_stateless_persons_wider_diss.pdf [accessed 05 March 2016], p. 47. 
59 H. Ardent, Origins, p. 279. 
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such a status would be to allow them leave to remain, as the limbo argument attempts to do, 
granting rights such as employment and benefits. 
 
Interestingly it can be said that the de jure definition of statelessness is a customary 
international legal term.60 As customary laws and treaty interpretations can change 
evolutively,61 based on changing political circumstances, 62  then the practical effects of de facto 
statelessness may change the scope of de jure statelessness. This may come about due to the 
increased rights given to de facto stateless peoples (as this work will show), meaning that 
having a distinction between de jure and de facto statelessness would be arbitrary as both would 
have the same implicit legal rights (or lack of rights) due to their statelessness, be it de jure or 
de facto. However this work does not suggest de jure and de facto are the same now, it only 
contributes to the evolutive approach by suggesting that de facto stateless should be given leave 
to remain, one particular status that is the same as those who are de jure stateless in the UK.63 
It does suggest however that de facto stateless cannot be narrowly defined, and can only be 
understood by analysing the scenarios which can create de facto statelessness.   
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
60 International Law Commission, Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries, (2006), A/61/10, 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_8_2006.pdf  [accessed 03 March 2016] pp. 48-9.  
61 S. Helmersen, ‘Evolutive treaty interpretation: Legality, Semantics and Distinctions’, (2013), European Journal 
of Legal Studies, 6, 127. 
62 See M. Milanovic, ‘The ICJ and Evolutionary Treaty Interpretation’, (2009), EJIL: Talk!, 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icj-and-evolutionary-treaty-interpretation/ [accessed 11 April 2016] for a general 
discussion about the evolutive approach to international law. 
63 Home Office, Asylum Policy Instruction Statelessness and applications for leave to remain, (2016), p. 5. 
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2. Statelessness and Europe 
 
This section will examine the developing ECtHR and ECJ rules around statelessness and how 
this may be used to protect those who are de facto stateless. It must be noted that such 
obligations make the limbo argument stronger, as applying the limbo argument will fulfil the 
case law obligations discussed below. Three cases are particularly focused on, Kuric and 
Others v Slovenia,64 and Genovese v Malta,65 both ECtHR cases, as well as the Rottmann case 
from the ECJ.66 These cases have this biggest effect on de facto statelessness protection, with 
Genovese and Rottmann being well studied, whilst Kuric has been largely ignored by 
academics. However, none of these cases have been studied with the intent to further the 
domestic ‘limbo argument’, making this analysis unique.   
 
2.1: The European Court of Human Rights 
There have been many articles written about the ‘interpretive obligation’ of ECtHR rulings 
made in s.2 of the Human Rights Act 1998.67 Discussion of this subject in detail is outside of 
the parameters of this work;68 however it is argued that although UK courts do not always 
consider such an ‘obligation’ as law,69 the courts normally apply ECtHR rulings.  
  
Much of the study on the ECtHR and statelessness has largely focused around 
determining de jure statelessness.70 Such works are useful as they highlight fundamental 
problems in the assigning of statelessness status and broaden the scope of what is de jure 
statelessness, allowing more to fall within this category. However as suggested above, the 
division between de jure and de facto statelessness does not reflect reality, of law or society, 
and can be harmful. Thus this work studies the protection that can be given to de facto stateless 
rather than expanding the arbitrary application criteria that is ‘de jure’ statelessness. In 
undertaking such an endeavour, this work uses many of the same sources as those who wish to 
expand the scope of de jure stateless, but with a different interpretation.  
  
Suggesting rights and protections for de facto stateless people, deprived of both for so 
long, is a controversial step and leads to questions about feasibility compared to expanding de 
jure stateless as an established legal route. The work of academics who study such issues should 
be applauded for their attempts to protect more vulnerable people.71 If such works were adopted 
these would allow many more people to be granted the status of stateless. But at present there 
is a hostile environment in allowing more immigrants and asylum seekers into the country.72 It 
                                                          
64 Kuric and others v Slovenia, (2012), ECtHR, Application no. 26828/06. 
65 Genovese v Malta, (2012), ECtHR, Application no. 53124/09. 
66 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, (2010), ECJ, C-135/08. 
67 Human Rights Act, 1998.  
68 See however, Lord Irvine, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’, Bingham Centre for the Rule of 
Law,’ (14th December 2011), UCL Judicial Institute < http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-
institute/files/British_Interpretation_of_Convention_Rights_-_Irvine.pdf> [accessed 22 March 2016], p. 9, and 
A. Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998’, 
(2004) 24, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, p. 264. 
69 See R v Horncastle and others, [2009], UKSC 14, [11] (Lord Phillips). 
70 See C. Vlieks, A European Human Rights Obligation for Statelessness Determination?, (2013), Master’s thesis, 
Tilburg Law School. 
71 See C. Vlieks, A European Human Rights Obligation for Statelessness Determination?, and L. van Waas, 
‘Fighting statelessness and discriminatory nationality law in Europe’, (2012), European Journal of Migration and 
Law, 14(3). 
72 S. Blinder, ‘UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern’, (2015), The 
Migration Observatory, http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Public%20Opinion-
Overall%20Attitudes%20and%20Level%20of%20Concern.pdf [accessed 22 March 2016]. 
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thus seems improbable that the government would give a generous definition of statelessness 
at this time. Instead this work suggests that the UK is currently in breach of its obligations, and 
thus this work hopes to force the State to act for de facto stateless rather than suggesting it 
might.   
 
It must be noted before proceeding further that there is no ‘right to nationality’ within 
the European Convention on Human Rights, and indeed the UK is not a party to the   European 
Convention on Nationality (1997),73 which prohibits discrimination in nationality laws and 
limits when nationality can be removed. It could be argued that this reduces the impact of any 
argument that the UK has an obligation to ensure rights for those who are de facto stateless. 
However, this work will argue that the cases below create stronger rights than those within the 
Convention on Nationality in any case, and these cases combined can be seen as the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of a right to nationality. 
 
2.1.1:  Development of protection for de facto Stateless 
This section will briefly discuss the historical case law before studying the more recent and 
important cases surrounding the protection of de facto stateless people. This then allows a 
narrative to expose the increasing protection such people have received. 
  
 The first case to discuss is that of Karassev and family v Finland,74 when, the host 
country, after denying citizenship, was put under an ‘Article 8 test’ whereby the Court looked 
‘on the one hand at whether the denial of nationality itself must be deemed arbitrary and, on 
the other hand, at whether the consequences of the denial of nationality were arbitrary.’75   
Neither of the two tests were satisfied in that case, however, the admission that it is not simply 
the act of denying nationality but the consequences such an action has, is important for the 
linking of nationality and statelessness. The consequences of a lack of nationality can be 
observed with the group under study in this work, the result of de facto statelessness being 
destitution. 
  
Slivenko v Latvia is a case studied in detail by academics.76 It suggested that being made 
stateless can cause a State to violate Article 8. This expansion of Article 8 was notable at the 
time and seen largely as the ECtHR expanding its power to protect illegal entrants,77 going 
against previous case law suggesting that the power of expulsion was only for the State.78 This 
was seen as the extension of the term ‘private life’ under Article 8, 79 confirmed in later cases 
where private life was found to be violated by deportations even when there had been no effects 
to family life.80 Thus this case is the basis for many other ECtHR decisions (including 
Genovese) involving private life and deportation, and is essential to this work.  
 
To ensure that an individual’s private life was not engaged the State would have to 
assess the individual’s statelessness, and determine whether they are de jure stateless. Hence 
the preoccupation of academics to further this definition and allow more cases within the de 
                                                          
73 European Convention on Nationality, 1997, (No. 166). 
74 Karassev and Family v. Finland, (1999), ECtHR, Application no. 31414/96. 
75 L. van Waas, ‘Fighting statelessness and discriminatory nationality law in Europe’, p. 252. 
76 Slivenko v. Latvia, (2003), ECtHR, Application no. 48321/99. 
77 D. Thym, ‘Respect for private and family life under article 8 ECHR in immigration cases: a human right to 
regularize illegal stay?’, (2008), International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 57(1), p. 100. 
78 Moustaquim v Belgium [1991], ECHR, No 12313/86, [43]. 
79 Y. Ronen, ‘The ties that bind: family and private life as bars to the deportation of immigrants’, (2012), 
International Journal of Law in Context, 8(2), p. 290  
80 Sisojeva et al v Latvia, [2007], ECHR, Application No.  60654/00. 
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jure statelessness category, and states increasingly allowing a stateless identification procedure, 
as the UK has.  
 
2.1.2: Genovese v Malta  
This case is often seen as the seminal one for discussion over nationality and statelessness,81 
as it focuses on the denial of nationality and the effects this has. Although this work is not 
advocating that refused asylum seekers should receive a nationality, it can be contended that 
being in limbo makes their nationality ineffective, and thus deprives them of an effective 
nationality. This would be a breach of ECHR rights (as will be discussed) and allowing leave 
to remain could avoid breaching such rights. 
 
In this case, the applicant was refused Maltese nationality because he was born out of 
wedlock. This did not leave the applicant stateless, and he could still go to Malta as an EU 
citizen, though only for a limited period of time. It was argued that as a national he could spend 
unlimited amounts of time there and thus be able to establish a better ‘family life’ with his 
father.82 The Court held that Maltese law did discriminate against him (in violation of Article 
14), under Article 8 grounds. The Court then gave a passage that is worth quoting in full and 
many academics argue makes nationality an attribute of Article 8: 
 
‘The denial of citizenship may raise an issue under Article 8 because of its impact on the private 
life of an individual, which concept is wide enough to embrace aspects of a person’s social 
identity. While the right to citizenship is not as such a Convention right and while its denial in 
the present case was not such as to give rise to a violation of Article 8, the Court considers that 
its impact on the applicant’s social identity was such as to bring it within the general scope 
and ambit of that Article.’83 
 
 This has been seen as confirming the applicability of Article 8 to nationality deprivation 
or denial,84 entrenching nationality into Article 8 jurisprudence, and most extremely, limiting 
the discretion of states in citizenship laws.85 As private life must be defined broadly,86 the scope 
to which this ruling may apply is broad. Vlieks suggests that statelessness fits this criterion,87 
and Van Wass points out that the broad statement and expansive meanings of all these terms 
allow a wide margin of discretion for the ECtHR.88  
 
 This then leaves the potential for the Court to explicitly argue that being de facto 
stateless leads to a breach of Article 8. As Waas pointed out, the terms are broad, it is not 
outside the realms of possibility to argue that refusal of residency status can affect social 
                                                          
81 See R. de Groota, and O. Vonk, ‘Nationality, Statelessness and ECHR's Article 8: Comments on Genovese v. 
Malta’, (2012), European Journal of Migration and Law, 14, pp. 317-325. 
82 Genovese [33]. 
83 Genovese [33], also see Mennesson v. France [2014] ECtHR, Application no. 65192/11 and Labassee v. France 
[2014], ECtHR, Application no. 65941/11. 
84 S. Köhn, ‘ECHR and citizenship: The case of Genovese v. Malta’, (11 October 2011), European Network on 
Statelessness, Blog, http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/echr-and-citizenship-case-genovese-v-malta [accessed 24 
March 2016]. 
85 J. Bialosky, ‘Regional Protection of the Right to a Nationality’, (2015), Cardozo Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, Vol. 24, p. 180. 
86 Niemietz v Germany, [1992], ECtHR, Application no. 72/1991/324/396. 
87 Vlieks, ‘Human Rights Obligation’, p. 19. 
88 L. Van Waas, ‘Rottmann and Genovese: How will Europe’s nationality laws stand up to the scrutiny of its 
regional courts?’, (12 March 2012), Tilberg University, Weblog Stateless programme,  
http://statelessprog.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/rottmann-and-genovese-how-will-europes.html [accessed 24 March 
2016]. 
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identity as it can lead to feelings of humiliating exclusion.89 Similarly the lack of comparative 
access to the same rights nationals possess can also be a question for discussion, as this can be 
seen as an active form of discrimination,90 leading to an effect on the refused asylum seekers 
Article 8 rights, allowing similar grounds to Genovese.      
  
However, this is optimistic. As Sir Burnton in Abdullah argues, Article 8 may give 
rights somewhere, but not always here; ‘I reject the submission that because the Secretary of 
State… [was] unable to enforce the return of the Appellant to Saudi Arabia, Article 8 required 
her to grant him leave to remain. Article 8 does not confer a right to reside in the country of 
one's choice.’91 This was said after the Genovese case, suggesting the UK Court had considered 
its effects. Similarly, the ECtHR case of Petropavlovskis v Latvia discussed Article 8 and 
citizenship, and qualified its role towards nationality.92 It made it explicitly clear that despite 
the Genovese judgement, there is no right to a specific nationality,93  and that domestic law, 
provided it is not arbitrary, has the final say on nationality.94  
 
But Sir Burnton’s views can be critiqued. If a refused asylum seeker lives in this country 
for a significant amount of time then ‘it is unreasonable to expect the applicant to put his life 
on hold and not to develop or deepen relationships whilst he remains here.’95 Thus one’s private 
life is engaged, and if this is the case then one’s de facto statelessness should be taken into 
account as a factor of this. Although Petropavlovskis attempts to put Article 8 ‘back in the box’ 
somewhat, as this work has already suggested, UK case law is influenced by ECtHR decisions, 
suggesting that Genovese should not be so easily dismissed. Instead Article 8 must apply for a 
de facto stateless person as one’s social identity is almost entirely based around the status one 
has and the refusal one has received. As the lack of citizenship has also led to deprivation 
within the UK it seems odd to suggest that the country where one has built up a private life 
should not be considered as the State to which leave to remain should be considered. Thus 
Article 8 rights have to apply here as they cannot be applicable elsewhere. A factor in this 
decision may be the length of time the individual has spent in the country, an aspect the next 
case will help with.    
 
2.1.3: Kuric and others v Slovenia 
This case concerned those who had their nationality ‘erased’ by the breakup of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and subsequent failure to register as a citizen with the 
State that took its place (Slovenia).96 The individuals, being born in another State, did not take 
the chance to register citizens in the new State they currently lived in, and so were not seen as 
citizens but as illegal immigrants and who could not change this status. Crucially this case 
involved those who were considered de jure stateless, and those seen as de facto stateless. A 
                                                          
89 See A. Margalit, The Decent Society, (Harvard University Press, 1998), and R. Sales, ‘The deserving and 
undeserving? Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Welfare in Britain’, (2002), Critical Social Policy, Vol. 22, pp. 456- 
478. 
90 See BMENational and the Chartered Institute of Housing, ‘Advising people who are destitute’, Housing Rights, 
http://www.housing-rights.info/advising-people-who-are-destitute.php#social-care [accessed 24 March 2016], 
for housing benefits in particular. 
91 Abdullah, [19]. 
92 Petropavlovskis v Latvia, [2015], ECtHR, Application no. 44230/06. 
93 Ibid [83]. 
94 Ibid [84]. 
95 E B Kosovo v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2008] UKHL 41, [Lord Brown] [37]. 
96 ‘Erased’ means ‘The applicants were left stateless after the dissolution of the Yugoslavia and later had their 
records removed from the civil registry, losing their right to residence’, see European Network on Statelessness, 
Kuric and Others v. Slovenia (2012), (June 2012), http://www.statelessness.eu/resources/kuric-and-others-v-
slovenia-2012 [accessed 18 April 2016]. 
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State no longer existing is a cause of de jure statelessness, and those who were considered 
stateless fell into this category. However, SFRY was a collection of what are now modern 
States and there was free movement between such areas during the existence of SFRY. But 
after the State ceased to exist, some individuals who were not of Slovenian nationality were 
living in the new State of Slovenia. The crux of the issue was that both the de jure stateless and 
non-de jure stateless in this case did not register for citizenship under the Aliens Act 1991,97 
they were thus not considered nationals and did not have access to State facilities such as 
housing. The Court stayed away from acknowledging those who were de facto stateless as 
some could, in theory, register for a nationality in their ‘home’ country,98 a State that did not 
exist at the time they moved to Slovenia. All the applicants in this case were refused permanent 
residence and it was found that their private and family life were affected, breaching Article 8.  
 
Focusing on those not considered de jure stateless, we can see the Court has awarded 
residency to those who do not meet the requirements for statelessness in law. They had another 
nationality, and in some cases were deported to their ‘home’ State, which did not exist at the 
time they entered what is now Slovenia.99 Whilst acknowledging that States can control 
individuals’ entry the Court stated that ‘measures restricting the right to reside in a country 
may, in certain cases, entail a violation of Article 8 of the Convention if they create 
disproportionate repercussions on the private or family life, or both, of the individuals 
concerned.’100 Being de facto stateless fits such a criteria, as both the denial of Slovenian 
nationality, and the consequences of that denial, breached Article 8. It can be observed they 
had no effective nationality in this time, and so they were de facto stateless because of this 
denial of nationality.  
 
The judgement also highlighted that the State’s failure to correct the ‘erasure’ for 
twenty years contributed to the violation of Article 8, as it left the applicants de facto stateless 
for a longer period.101 In this time the applicants could not live a normal life, hence the breach 
of Article 8. The group studied in this work also suffer a difficulty in being able to live a private 
life, as they have limited economic and social rights.102  
 
This ruling suggests that the enjoyment of private life is impeded whilst being de facto 
stateless, suggesting at least one current UK procedure around the grounds of private life is 
incorrect. Under UK law, one way to achieve leave to remain status on the grounds of private 
life is to have been living continuously in the UK for a period of 20 years.103 According to 
Kuric, being de facto stateless impedes the enjoyment of an Article 8 right, but in the UK, if a 
de facto stateless person enjoys twenty years stay, they have proven they have a private life 
and hence they will have residency. This is contradictory, a de facto stateless person’s private 
life is impeded by being de facto stateless, thus they cannot be expected to establish one for 
twenty years. This implies that current UK law conflicts with ECHR decisions and does not 
give the weight to private life that the ECtHR does. 
 
                                                          
97 Aliens Act, 1991 
98 Kuric [330]. 
99 Ibid [34]. 
100 Ibid [355]. 
101 Ibid [319]. 
102 Ibid [227]. 
103 Immigration Rules, s. 276ADE(1)(iii). 
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One reason for such an inconsistency in Kuric is that awarding citizenship is a 
contentious area, where the courts appreciate the State’s sovereignty,104 and yet are seeking to 
protect those most vulnerable. However it is interesting to note that this protection extends to 
such a degree that the ‘Margin of Appreciation’, which allows more State discretion in the 
application of ECHR rights, was not extended in this case, instead the court prioritised the 
rights of the de facto stateless.105 This suggests future ECtHR uniformity in the way de facto 
stateless people are protected as there would be less national variation.  Kudric has been seen 
as a ‘pilot’ case, a method to restructure systematic violations of Articles, in this case around 
citizenship.106 The Court seems to be implicitly protecting de facto stateless people by 
suggesting their Article 8 rights have been breached. This is also evidenced by the language 
used, at one point using the classic Arendt phrase ‘right to have rights’.107    
 
However, it must be noted that the breach in this case was largely an administrative 
one, (both the Aliens Act and Legal Status Act 1999 failure to correct the ‘erasure’ of these 
applicants),108 the failure in the law had led to these applicants living in a ‘legal limbo,’109 (a 
descriptive term rather than the UK legal argument that will be developed in the next section). 
Applying this to refused asylum seekers, it can be claimed that the UK has no such 
administrative errors-the statelessness procedure is seen as a due process. So if one is not found 
de jure stateless under this process then they have no legal residency claim, and a state has the 
power to deport as part of a regulatory power to control its borders. It is simply a question of 
when it is safe to do so.  
 
Although the refusal of de jure statelessness does not immediately create de facto 
statelessness, there is still a vast group that can fall into this category- as suggested in the 
definition section, de facto statelessness can occur in a multitude of ways. Similarly, although 
the Court did correct a legal mistake, it also focused on the effects of this action, and it can be 
argued that the effects of this de facto statelessness is analogous to refused asylum seekers.  
 
 For the applicants in Kuric they were refused their residency and threatened with and 
eventually deported to, a State they argued they did not belong to.110 For the groups studied in 
this work, deportation often relies on compliance with the removal,111 leading many to stay in 
the UK, in a state of deprivation for significant amounts of time.112 Arguably for both groups 
the effect is the same, the denial of rights, leading to the interference of their Article 8 rights. 
To have rights pending their removal may satisfy their Article 8 rights, although there is debate 
that even with such rights, being in a state of anticipation for such a long period may breach 
                                                          
104 Kuric [351-3], the court found the laws themselves were pursuing a legitimate aim as they allowed control over 
entry and residence into the State.  
105 Kuric [387], the Margin of Appreciation is ‘the space for manoeuvre that the Strasbourg organs are willing to 
grant national authorities, in fulfilling their obligations under the ECHR’, S. Greer , The Margin of Appreciation: 
Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights, (2000, Council of Europe), p. 
5. 
106 A. Huneeus,  ‘Reforming the State from Afar: Structural Reform Litigation at the Human Rights Courts’, 
(2015), The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, p. 18. 
107 Kuric [319]. 
108 Ibid [58-60]. 
109 Ibid [302]. 
110 Kuric [126]. 
111 J. Sweeney, ‘The Human Rights of Failed Asylum Seekers in the United Kingdom’, (2008), Public Law, p. 
281.  
112 See Lord Bishop of Newcastle, Hansard, HL, Vol 693, Col GC289, (12 July 2007), who pointed out ‘We are 
committing hundreds of thousands of people to destitution for the next 14 years. What do we think we are doing?’ 
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other rights.113 This interpretation allows the effect of Karassev, the appreciation of 
consequences for a lack of nationality, to be observed, and is a realistic comparison between 
the applicants in Kuric, and the groups studied in this work. Both groups cannot (or could not) 
claim residency and argue against their deportation. Similarly, an expansive application of 
Article 8 is in line with the Genovese judgement, although not published at the time of this 
case. Despite the UK statelessness procedure, being de facto stateless means you cannot enjoy 
a private life. Thus this is in breach of Article 8.       
 
2.2: The European Court of Justice 
The ECJ tries to enable the uniformity of European law in its jurisdiction. Under Article 267 
of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),114 the Court can have 
preliminary rulings for the interpretation of treaties and acts of bodies or agencies of the EU. 
Although interpretation does not mean application, some Court decisions have had such an 
effect,115 and despite having jurisdiction over Union laws not national ones, the Court has 
looked at national laws that impact upon Union legislation.116 Thus this Court can have a large 
impact and its decisions encourage uniformity, suggesting that the rulings are de facto binding 
or else the State may be at fault in later cases.117 
 
2.2.1: Rottmann 
This case concerned stripping German nationality from an individual who obtained it by 
deception, and whether this was allowed under Article 20 of the TFEU,118 which endows 
nationals with citizenship of the Union.119 It held that depriving one of nationality was legal, 
and in tune with international law, as long as it was proportionate to the gravity of the offence 
and the consequences of de-nationalisation.120 In this case as he had acquired such nationality 
by deception this was proportional.121 Despite the fact the Court also held that it was for 
national courts to determine nationality depravation, it gave precedent for domestic Courts to 
use European legal principles, including proportionality and non-discrimination, suggesting 
that the Court in future may ‘test nationality laws against key EU principles’.122 This 
development pushes EU law to the brink of a revolutionary concept, effective EU citizenship 
that is taken seriously by all Member States.123 
  
It is important to stress that the effects of the proportionality test when used in 
conjunction with the above suggested breaches in ECtHR rules, along with ECJ rulings which 
also uses the proportionality test, may create an argument that the creating of de facto stateless 
peoples may be disproportionate to the State legitimate aim of border control. The causing of 
de facto statelessness can be caused by the refusal of asylum or humanitarian protection to 
applicants who then cannot be deported, meaning they are in a state of limbo. 
                                                          
113 See C. Vlieks, ‘A European Human Rights Obligation for Statelessness?’, p. 20 for a discussion on the case of 
Kurt v Turkey [1998], ECtHR,  Application No 24276/94. 
114 Article 267, TFEU. 
115 Stoke on Trent City Council v B&Q Plc, [1993], ECJ (C-169/91). 
116 Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein [1970] ECJ, (9/70). 
117 See R. Flamini, ‘Judicial Reach: The Ever-Expanding European Court of Justice’, (12 November 2012), World 
Affairs, Winter Edition,  http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/judicial-reach-ever-expanding-european-
court-justice [accessed 25 March 2016].  
118 Article 20, TFEU. 
119 Rottmann, [4]. 
120 Ibid [55-6]. 
121 Ibid [57]. 
122 L. Van Waas, ‘Rottmann and Genovese’, para 4. 
123 D. Kochenov, ‘The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification’, (2013) European 
Law Journal, Vol.19(4), p. 503. 
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Proportionality has been said to be the ‘manifestation of the perennial quest to invest 
adjudication with precision and objectivity,’124 by its system of assessing whether the measure 
by a State had a legitimate aim, suitable to achieve the aim, was necessary to achieve the aim 
and if the measure was reasonable.125 These individuals have been made to be de facto stateless 
(as will be discussed below) and this may be disproportionate to the aim of national security, 
as creating de facto stateless individuals does not further this aim, as they may be then harder 
to detain.  
  
In this case it was proportionate to withdraw nationality, partly because he would not 
be stateless as he held another nationality.126 In Kuric the State measures were not in 
accordance with the law as they were found to have ‘lacked the requisite standards of 
foreseeability and accessibility’,127 it did pursue a legitimate aim in creating citizenship,128 but 
was not ‘necessary’ as the inability to obtain valid residence violated the positive obligation 
for the State to ensure that ‘failure to obtain Slovenian citizenship would not disproportionately 
affect the Article 8 rights of the ‘erased’.129 Thus proportionality can suggest that nationality 
policies are invalid, in Kuric for instance due to ineffectual laws. However, if all the above 
points are brought together in one proportionality test, an argument can be made that the UK’s 
stateless procedure is disproportionate to the breach of Article 8 rights of de facto stateless 
persons. 
  
It can be assumed that the UK measure of refusing full rights to de facto stateless 
persons would pass the ‘legitimate’ aim marker, as controlling borders and citizenship is often 
considered legitimate, as was the case in Kuric. Persons who are de facto stateless have passed 
through a system that has not found them eligible for residence or full protection. Thus they 
can be deported.  
 
However, suitability may have an argument. The current system often leaves refused 
asylum seekers destitute for long periods of time due to inability to return, examples being 
Zimbabweans, Iranians, Iraqis, Sudanese, Afghans and Somalis, who cannot be deported due 
to documented violence or human rights violations.130Although control of borders is a 
legitimate aim, the inability to deport people means the current system of refusing full rights 
of residency whilst keeping individuals destitute within the country does not control the 
external borders, only the internal discriminatory borders. 
  
The lack of suitability then adds arguments to the question of necessity. It may be 
necessary to deport an individual, but when that is not possible it is not necessary to deprive 
the person of rights. As suggested above, this lack of residency can violate Article 8 rights 
through the harm of social identity and the conditions in which one lives. The extent of the 
deprivation and violation of the Article 8 right then suggests this measure is unreasonable. 
Linking back to the start of this work the reasons for a destitution policy may have been due to 
the ‘self’ proving its intolerance to the ‘other’, reasoning which holds little weight in law. 
                                                          
124 S. Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009), International Journal of Constitutional 
Law, 7,3 p. 469. 
125 P Craig and G de Burca, EU Law (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 526. 
126 Rottmann [34]. 
127 Kuric [346]. 
128 Ibid [353]. 
129 Ibid [359]. 
130 Still Human still Here, Briefing paper on destitute refused asylum seekers, (2009), Resources, 
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Thus an argument can be made that the UK measure of deprivation of rights is 
disproportionate in its effect of destitution which is extreme enough to violate Article 8. As 
domestic cases are influenced by ECtHR and ECJ law, if accepted, this argument is 
increasingly persuasive.  
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3. The Limbo Argument in Domestic Law 
 
This section will now explore how to apply the above protection for de facto stateless peoples 
through the limbo argument, and then answer criticisms to this argument. The limbo argument 
has close correlations with the arguments given in favour of protecting de facto stateless people, 
despite never mentioning the term ‘de facto stateless’. However, as has previously been 
mentioned, as there has been no study whatsoever on this argument, it must fall to this work to 
show the very close link between the limbo argument and the protection offered to de facto 
stateless people, and thus exemplify how the limbo argument can be the domestic application 
of the above ECtHR rulings. It relies on the view that refused asylum seekers in limbo have 
effectively lost their nationality. They are then de facto stateless, and thus have the protection 
outlined above. 
 
3.1 How the Limbo Argument may operate 
This is a topic worthy of another essay in its scope and practice. However, this work will sketch 
out how the limbo argument would work, how it would incorporate the above protection of 
Article 8, and then will answer criticisms of this view. 
 
 First of all, we must summarise the protection the ECtHR is presumably offering. Under 
Kuric, and the older cases Karassev and Slivenko, we can see that the effects of being de facto 
stateless can be an infringement of Article 8. If we then apply Genovese we can see that the 
denial of nationality is also an Article 8 infringement. Finally, if we follow Rottman (ECJ) 
proportionality should apply domestically,131 and it should be questioned whether the denial of 
rights to those who are already within the country is proportionate to the legitimate aim of 
boarder control. 
 
 Applying these cases to refused asylum seekers; first, we can see that they are destitute 
and unable to be deported. This suggests they are under the Kuric principles, their private life 
have been interfered with.  
 
Secondly, they have also claimed refugee status, but this has been denied. However, as 
they cannot be deported (due to the risk that their home State will breach their human rights), 
their original nationality is limited in the rights it will allow the individual to access. That 
nationality would not bring them rights or equal treatment (to UK nationals), it would only 
allow them to voluntary return (an issue that will be dealt with later).132 As for many this is not 
an option they want to consider,133 their nationality is not effective. Thus an argument can be 
made that by placing them into a position where they will become de facto stateless, the UK is 
denying them their effective nationality. Their old one is ineffective, but they cannot claim a 
UK one. This would bring them within the Genovese argument. 
 
                                                          
131 European Commission, ‘Summary of  C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, judgment of 2 March 
2010’, (2010), Summaries of Important Judgements, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/arrets/08c135_en.pdf 
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132 Or ‘Assisted Voluntary Return’, where the UK government give some financial assistance and advice for those 
who entered the UK illegally and wish to return to their home country, see Gov.uk, Return home voluntarily if 
you're in the UK illegally, https://www.gov.uk/return-home-voluntarily/who-can-get-help [accessed 15 April 
2016]. 
133 Often due to security considerations in their home country see R. Black et al, ‘Understanding voluntary return’, 
(2004), Home Office, Online Report 50/04, 
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 Thirdly, there is the final stage, proportionality. As suggested above, it may be deemed 
disproportionate to not allow rights to those de facto stateless who have passed the border. 
There is no legitimate aim apart from to ensure that they do not have full access to State rights, 
a policy partly followed due to concerns of a ‘pull factor’, that is the conditions enjoyed by 
these migrants would encourage other migrants, a view flawed by lack of evidence (to be 
discussed in the next section). Although they may not be entitled to UK nationality, it would 
be proportionate that they should be given leave to remain, until they can be safely deported, 
then they can make a contribution to society in the time they remain in the UK. Of course such 
deportation would still be distressing, and the increased amount of time such people have lived 
in the UK for, and with increased rights, may enforce their Article 8 rights, making deportation 
more difficult. However this is a topic for another study.  
 
 We can now suggest how the limbo argument would take effect. As stated at the start 
of this work, those who are de facto stateless should be given leave to remain. This would allow 
them the right to work, to housing benefits and to further education loans, all of which would 
allow them to make a contribution to society. It would not give them a right to nationality, as 
being a British citizen would mean they would not be able to be deported if and when it is safe 
to do so. 
 
 The question is, how does one determine whether the key part of this argument ‘no 
reasonable likelihood of return’ is determined? There is no easy answer to this, and no way to 
suggest that being destitute somehow ‘qualifies’ one to be given leave to remain as if this were 
‘proof’ of the inability to deport. Ideally it would be realised at the last asylum refusal that there 
is little way to deport a refused asylum seeker in these cases, and thus offer them leave to 
remain. There has already been mention of some of the countries where the State is currently 
unable to deport to. It would thus be ideal that if refused asylum, but coming from a place 
where there is no immediate allowance for deportation, the individual is given leave to remain. 
This leave to remain could then last weeks or years, but it would stop destitution for this period. 
 
 However, there are legal criticisms against the limbo argument, as well as competing 
existing legal policies. These will now be examined and the limbo argument justified. 
   
3.2: Voluntary Return 
Perhaps the most obvious answer against the idea that de facto stateless peoples who cannot be 
returned should be given protection, is that, for some of them, voluntary return is an option. 
This return may not be to their home within the State, but would certainly be in the State 
itself.134 
  
To give a better example of this, the State of Zimbabwe can be used. A Shona political 
asylum seeker, who has been refused, cannot be deported back into the Western areas of that 
State even if that is where their home was, as they may face discrimination,135 and attract 
adverse attention due to their political persuasion.136 Instead they can be internally re-located 
to cities such as Harare or Bulawayo.137 Specific arguments can be made to refute this, for 
instance that the economic situation in Harare is enough to amount to deporting someone back 
                                                          
134 See J. Brokenshire Hansard, Written question – 3447, (22 June 2015), for ‘Internal Relocation’. 
135 Home Office, ‘Country Information and Guidance Zimbabwe: Political Opposition to ZANU-PF’ (October 
2014), para 1.3.22. 
136 RT (Zimbabwe) and others (Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2012] UKSC 38, 
[16], (Lord Dyson). 
137 Home Office, ‘Country Information and Guidance Zimbabwe’, p. 42. 
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to destitution, but these are arguments for an asylum case and will not be developed here. The 
point remains that the individual can choose to end their destitution, and have full rights of 
their nationality, in their home country. 
  
Similar themes are reflected through UK law, for instance that there is no obligation to 
provide mental health support for destitute asylum seekers if such mental health was brought 
about by the destitution.138 The reason for this is that the destitution was voluntarily entered 
into so the State has no further responsibility. 
 
 Such examples are within a wider strategy of the UK state using destitution as a strategy 
to both deter new arrivals and to minimise costs to the State (the feasibility of both strategies 
will be discussed in the next section).139 Although this is not explicit in legislation, the above 
mental health provisions for instance is enough that the Courts cannot over-rule such 
arguments. Thus there should be no limbo argument when the applicant can quite easily remove 
themselves from such limbo. 
  
However, very few refused asylum seekers choose voluntary return as they fear the 
situation in their home country.140 Although the courts in this country may have deemed their 
application inadmissible that does not change the perception of fear, a fear so strong they would 
rather stay in the destitution the UK government has enforced. As voluntary return is obviously 
voluntary, this then means the State must be able to forcibly return applicants, and to do that 
the State must ensure that where they will be returned to is safe. 
 
If we turn back to the Zimbabwean example, an applicant could be deported and be 
forcibly relocated. However, this would bring them to the attention of the authorities, would 
expose the individual’s reason for leaving the State (political) and immediately mean they are 
identifiable and at risk. Thus they cannot be deported as they may be at risk of an Article 3 
ECHR violation, and the UK has to wait until it is safe to return Zimbabweans to Zimbabwe 
generally, or suggest they return by themselves and re-locate. But if the individual refuses to 
do one, and the State cannot do the other, the destitution remains. 
 
This then is the crucial fact. The applicant may have chosen the destitution over 
presumed persecution, but it is still destitution, and with their lack of rights there is no way to 
end such destitution. This destitution continues to violate their Article 8 rights, and causes costs 
to the community as well.141 Thus they remain de facto stateless, and the UK ignores reality 
and continues its rhetoric about destitution being a choice. 
 
3.3: Current Procedure 
There are resemblances of the limbo argument in current law. An example of this is in the 
‘Enforcement Instructions and Guidance’, which has an ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
application for non-removal,142 one of which is ‘length of time accrued in the UK outside of 
                                                          
138 See H. Dumper, R. Malfait and N. Scott-Flynn, Mental Health, 
‘Destitution and Asylum-Seekers: A study of destitute asylum-seekers in the dispersal areas of the South East of 
England’, (2006), Care Services Improvement Partnership, https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/CSIP%20-
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139 See N. Fancott and S. York, ‘Enforced destitution: impediments to return and access section 4 "hard cases" 
support’, (2008), Journal of Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law. 
140 R. Black et al, ‘Understanding voluntary return’, (2004), pp.16-8. 
141 British Red Cross and Boaz Trust, ‘A decade of destitution: Time to make a change’, (2013), p.5. 
142 Enforcement instructions and guidance, 2012, s. 53. 
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migrant’s control’, a factor of which is the practical likelihood of removal.143 In theory this 
sounds like the limbo argument. 
 
However, in practice this ‘exceptional circumstance’ is made extremely exceptional by 
the fact that the applicant has to make a ‘genuine effort’ to secure voluntary departure.144 As 
set out above, most refused asylum seekers would not make such an application precisely 
because they do not want to return. There are also ‘stalemate’ situations, such as the 
Zimbabwean example above, where voluntary return is possible in certain circumstances, but 
deportations would not be allowed. Thus the applicant would spend time in the UK which is 
outside of their control (as return may mean persecution, which is then outside of their control). 
 
This then means people are still destitute, and one only has to look at the numbers of 
destitute refused asylum seekers to see that this ‘exceptional circumstance’ is too exceptional. 
As well as this, the arguments outlined above show that being destitute limits the enjoyment of 
one’s Article 8 and Article 3 rights.145 So this is a limited form of the limbo argument, which 
does not do enough to help refused asylum seekers.   
 
3.4: Abdullah 
This case concerned a similar applicant to Kuric. It involved an applicant from a disputed 
origin, who argued he was stateless and so must be given nationality in this country.146 The 
Court of Appeal responded that although he was entitled to his Article 8 rights, he was not so 
here.147 
 
 This case also went onto examine the limbo argument as well as some of the cases 
discussed above. In declaring the limbo argument to be premature,148 Lord Burton claimed this 
case was different from Kuric by pointing out that the ‘erasure’ the applicants in that case 
endured was not a result of their own doing, whilst in this case the applicant chose to come to 
the UK and endure their de facto statelessness.149 
 
 This is perhaps a blinkered view. There are of course large differences between the two 
cases. In Kuric the applicants were in the State much longer than the individuals discussed in 
this work. They also entered their current host State when it was legal to do, but were seen as 
illegal entrants due to faults in the law. However, as suggested, the ECtHR recognised the 
effects of de facto statelessness and not just the manner in which one found themselves to be in 
this position. As set out above, the two sets of applicants were both deprived of their Article 8 
rights, thus there are clear similarities between the two cases. Furthermore, it can be added that 
originally the applicants did not choose destitution, but protection. The State is choosing 
destitution for the applicants. 
 
 There is also the question of the fact that the occupants in Kuric came to their host State 
legally. However, this seems like a null point. To claim asylum, one may travel in any way 
possible, including forgery or illegally crossing a border.150 Once asylum is requested in the 
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host State there are procedural requirements that are triggered. Thus it can be seen that the 
individuals came here legally, but by being refused they are staying here illegally, a problem 
that can be resolved by allowing their living in the host state. 
 
3.5: Destitution Protection 
There may be arguments that instead of suggesting de facto stateless people should be allowed 
leave to remain, they should simply be given protection from destitution. This would perhaps 
be a simpler argument. There have already been calls to end this destitution,151 and the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights has suggested the UK may be in breach of its obligations by 
allowing such destitution to occur.152 So instead of giving leave to remain, perhaps the rights 
given to asylum seekers waiting to hear a decision should be extended to those de facto 
stateless- that is, housing benefits and financial assistance.153 
 
 This would be an easier goal to achieve, and make sure that those who have been 
refused asylum are not given greater rights than those still waiting for their decision to be made 
on their asylum status. This would ensure that the system remains fair for those who need it 
most. 
 
 But this work contends that instead of increasing rights to the level of asylum seekers, 
both groups should be given leave to remain or something akin to it. Although they may be 
waiting for a decision on their application, there seems little reason why asylum seekers could 
not also contribute to society by having something similar to leave to remain until that decision 
is made. This would not harm the decision making process but would allow them to escape 
near destitution, as the current system forces on them. Instead both groups could have a more 
expansive Article 8 right by having the right to work, or for education for instance, attributes 
that amount to living rather than just life. It must also be noted that some de facto stateless 
people are in employment under the current system illegally, meaning they are vulnerable to 
exploitation.154 Allowing leave to remain would limit such exploitation. 
 
 However, this leads to a separate point. Asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers are 
different categories of people. Some refused asylum seekers cannot be deported, as they may 
be in the UK indefinitely, they should be able to make a contribution to society as this would 
allow them to fulfil their Article 8 rights. For asylum seekers, their presence in the UK may be 
very brief, as they may be deported if their claim fails. This does not detract from the argument 
that they should be given something similar to leave to remain in order to contribute to society, 
but the fact that their limbo has a clear end-point makes for two different cases. 
 
3.6: The longer they stay the more Article 8 rights they get     
This is an argument based around the fact that there is an acknowledged public policy good in 
reducing the number of asylum seekers, limiting immigration and carrying out deportations.155 
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The current system ignores the destitution of refused asylum seekers and deports them when 
necessary. This then ignores the Article 8 rights they have, unless it is very clear ones such as 
family life demonstrated through being a parent.156 If the system proposed in this work was to 
occur, many more Article 8 rights would be seen for destitute asylum seekers. This would 
increase the population of immigrants, not decrease it, as is the public good argument. 
 
 This is perhaps a blunt and distasteful argument for many. However, it is clear within 
the Conservative manifesto to reduce the number of immigrants,157 and there has been rhetoric 
about having a more ‘controlled’ asylum system.158 As this party are currently in power, it can 
be suggested that reducing the number of asylum seeker claims and rights are a democratic 
policy. Allowing these suggestions in this paper would be another example of the ECtHR 
ignoring domestic wants, and effective ‘human rights imperialism’.159 
 
 Indeed, following the cases set in this paper would increase the Article 8 rights for 
refused asylum seekers. However, it does not automatically mean they will have a right to stay 
if the country they are to be deported to is now safe. Instead it means that they have to argue 
their case, as many immigrants do. Leave to remain does not automatically grant citizenship 
for all those destitute, it simply offers an easement to the position they have found themselves 
in.  
 
 The argument around the public good is also a valid one, however it is also in the public 
good to follow the law.160 As set out, the ECtHR does not have an automatic effect on the UK, 
but it is usually followed. To follow it means a consistent set of human rights laws across those 
who are signatories to the ECtHR. It may be in the government’s interests to reduce 
immigration numbers, but the preservation of the law is of a higher order of importance. 
Another theoretical point can be added that rights are anti-majoritarian in character,161 allowing 
individual needs to prioritised against the will of the majority, thus stopping a ‘tyranny of the 
majority’.162 Thus allowing the limbo argument would be the fulfilment of rights obligations, 
furthering the rule of law and allowing those who are de facto stateless to make contribution to 
society, a point that will be analysed in the next section.  
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4. Policy Arguments 
 
The policy arguments against the implementations of the above legal proposals are perhaps the 
biggest barrier. In the current political climate, immigrants are seen negatively in the UK,163 
linking in with the theoretical analysis in this work; if asylum seekers are seen as the ‘other’, 
and as a ‘free rider’ on communal systems,164 then there will be less enthusiasm to allow them 
equal rights. However, the current climate of destitution and the refusal to allow that destitution 
to end means that refused asylum seekers are kept in a right-less state, and not allowed to be 
able to contribute to society, and are thus kept as an ‘other’. This section will critique the policy 
arguments against refused asylum seekers having leave to remain and suggest that the benefits 
of allowing this would far outweigh any negative ramifications.  
 
4.1: The Pull factor 
This is the greatest policy argument against giving refused asylum seekers greater rights. The 
argument stems from the view that more asylum seekers coming to the UK is a negative aspect, 
then argues that giving greater rights to refused asylum seekers will encourage more asylum 
seekers to come to the UK.165 Thus the current system must be kept as harsh as possible to 
dissuade future arrivals, and encourage current ones to return to their home State. 
 
 However, this is a critical misunderstanding of the current system. Most asylum seekers 
are intent upon being within the European Union rather than the UK specifically,166 and often 
the smuggler has the greatest influence, if not direct decision, over which country to go to.167 
Often those that do choose to come to the UK do so because of family members or past colonial 
ties.168 Few have heard of benefits, or even the difficulties of benefitting from asylum 
policies,169 indeed one study has shown that the main knowledge migrants had of the UK was 
based around football.170 Thus the idea of an ‘easy’ life in Britain as a pull factor can be 
critiqued firstly for lack of evidence, most know very little of the country. Secondly, it can be 
argued that ‘deterrents’ do not work in reducing asylum seekers as most do not choose to come 
to the UK, but simply want to flee persecution. As most know very little of the UK, they also 
know little of the deterrent policies.    
 
 Relating such an argument to this work, it would be intentionally cruel to allow current 
refused asylum seekers to be shown as an example of how harsh the UK is, as well as senseless. 
As these people cannot be deported with any particular speed there is no way they can be seen 
as an ‘example’ in their home State. But as this would do little to reduce the number of asylum 
seekers coming to the UK in any case, the idea of deterrence, and the destitution and lack of 
rights that this entails, seems ineffectual and abusive. 
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4.2: Free-rider 
There are some arguments that allowing refused asylum seekers leave to remain would create 
a greater strain on communal resources, such as the welfare state.171 As such people have paid 
no income tax, they have contributed less to the communal benefits and yet may be benefitting 
more. This is against fundamental norms of fairness, potentially causing widespread 
dissatisfaction in society.172 It would also cost the State more money, depriving the citizens of 
the host State. 
 
 Again this argument can be critiqued by both the current ‘destitution system’ and the 
way the limbo argument would operate. The current system encourages free riding as the 
refused asylum seekers cannot contribute to the income taxes or employment of communal 
systems. They contribute to society as a whole in many other ways, for instance volunteering, 
but by the refusal to allow refused asylum seekers leave to remain, they are kept in the position 
of an ‘other’. So the free rider argument is only bolstered by current policies. 
 
 In contrast, if refused asylum seekers were given rights to employment or education, 
there is evidence that they could contribute more to their society than they would take away. 
Studies have suggested that Syrian refugees (who have the right to work) largely compete in 
sectors with other migrants.173 This is a problem, as it can result in wage deflation in such areas 
of employment,174 but arguably one that affects States which have taken far more migrants per 
population than the UK has, such as Lebanon. In general, migrants with a right to work have 
contributed more to their societies in acting as both entrepreneurs,175 and as consumers.176 
Indeed even the most pessimistic of studies suggest that migrants with the right to work are 
neither a gain or a drain for society, suggesting that this group pays less income taxes, as they 
have less employment, but do not claim higher benefits than others.177 Even on non-financial 
matters there is little drain on communal resources, for instance the wait for NHS appointments 
has largely been unaffected.178 Indeed as some asylum seekers are highly educated, they may 
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be able to contribute to highly skilled industries or services such as the NHS or 
manufacturing.179  
 
To reduce destitution, there may however be a short-term increase in benefit-  spending, 
as those now destitute would be eligible for housing. However, this may be offset by an increase 
in tax revenue, as stated above, and is linked to a wider argument about the lack of social 
housing in the UK,180 which will not be discussed here. In any case, it can be seen that this is 
a short-term increase, as when such migrants have work they will no longer need such housing.  
 
Another argument focuses around the refused asylum seekers have on their local 
communities. The current system already costs the local government (rather than the Home 
Office) expense when they have to support those who are not destitute in local authority 
housing.181 If refused asylum seekers could support themselves, then this cost would be reduced 
in the long-term. Also, at current large networks of charities, churches and friends who support 
those who are destitute also spend financial and human resources on supporting destitute 
asylum seekers. It is an abstract, but reasonable, argument to make that if destitute asylum 
seekers could support themselves, then such charities and churches would be free to able to 
contribute to society in other ways, that may not strictly be financial.   
 
 Thus, rather than being a free rider, allowing the limbo argument would allow a greater 
work-force, generate more resources in the local community and would save the government 
expense. Rather than costing the State money, allowing the limbo argument would save money. 
 
4.3: Democratic Mandate 
As eluded to in earlier parts of this work, the current government has encouraged the refusal of 
asylum seekers to be seen as in the public good, allowing deportation. Although destitution is 
not part of such a mandate, it can be seen that allowing refused asylum seekers almost equal 
rights to UK citizens may not be considered a ‘public good’ in a climate which does not favour 
immigrants and has voted in a government determined to remove more asylum seekers. To 
allow the limbo argument would go against these wishes. 
 
 As stated earlier, rights are essential to the workings of democracy, and this argument 
will not be discussed again. However, it is notable that although there may be a public good 
argument for deportation, this is not the same as destitution. There is little public good to this 
process for, as stated, there is little refused asylum seekers can do about this situation, it costs 
the community in which they live money, and it starves the State of greater human and financial 
resources. Also it must be noted that although there is a democratic mandate to admit less 
immigrants, refused asylum seekers are already here, they are simply in a state of limbo due to 
the inability to access the internal borders. Thus allowing the limbo argument does not harm 
this democratic mandate, and allows the community in which they were destitute, and the State 
itself, to have more workers and a higher income. 
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 This then links to a further theoretical argument about the health of democracy. By 
having policies focused on people who have no voice in how such policies will be shaped, the 
ideal of democracy is corrupted.182 This is further violated by the fact that such people, who 
are within the State, are limited in their voice, privileges and security,183 and then have no 
opportunity to gain such attributes, ones that are at least given to subjects of a State.184 Thus 
by having such laws we are damaging principles of equality, these principles are pivotal to 
democracy or other-wise we have a caste-like system that is not democracy at all.185 Currently 
refused asylum seekers are not even eligible for the rights of subjects as they are liable for 
destitution, this is damaging for democracy, more so than ignoring the tyranny of the majority.  
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Conclusion 
 
Refused asylum seekers are in a state of limbo, unable to make a contribution to the society 
they have found themselves in. Although they have the option of voluntary return, many refuse 
to take such an action due to fears of persecution on return. Whether this be an unfounded fear 
or not, it creates a reality for some refused asylum seekers of destitution until their home State’s 
political climate has become safer. As this can last years, refused asylum seekers remain 
without the rights of the citizens of the UK. Their old nationality no longer allows them the 
‘right to have rights’, as if they return to their home country most of their rights will be lost to 
them if they are persecuted. At the same time they are refused rights in their host State. This 
makes them de facto stateless. 
 
 Being de facto stateless allows several arguments from the ECtHR and the ECJ to apply 
to them, namely the ruling that refusing de facto stateless people rights is disproportionate to 
the aim of border security. The effects of being right-less is an affront to the Article 8 of 
applicants as it creates considerable hardship. The UK has some laws around the Article 8 of 
de facto stateless people, but this is incompatible with ECtHR rulings as it requires a length of 
private life in the UK to qualify for leave to remain, however any time spent as a de facto 
stateless person infringes that private life, so waiting a period of twenty years is actually having 
ones Article 8 rights abused for that length of time. 
 
 The limbo argument allows the application of the ECtHR rulings in domestic law. After 
a speedy assessment of likelihood of deportation, the UK should instead allow leave to remain 
for those who would be de facto stateless, until the safety of their deportation can be assured. 
Although this would allow refused asylum seekers to build up further Article 8 rights and thus 
make a future case for staying in the host country, this is a natural consequence of many refused 
asylum seekers living in the UK in any case.  
 
 Although there are some arguments to improve the rights of de facto stateless people, 
the limbo argument is the best choice of action. The current procedures encourages voluntary 
return, something most refused asylum seekers will not contemplate, and does nothing to 
diminish the destitution they face, meaning it is a blinkered view of reality. Protecting refused 
asylum seekers against being destitute is a very notable aim but does not go far enough to allow 
refused asylum seekers to contribute to society, as the limbo argument does. 
 
 Finally the limbo argument can be seen as economically and politically viable, 
respecting democracy, but disallowing the state of destitution so many refused asylum seekers 
face. It is the best policy option for these people, and is a natural understanding of the law the 
ECtHR and the ECJ produces.      
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Cases 
Abdullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 42. 
Chahal v. United Kingdom [1996], 23 EHRR 413. 
E B Kosovo v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2008] UKHL 41. 
Genovese v Malta, (2012), ECtHR, Application no. 53124/09. 
Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein [1970] ECJ, (9/70). 
Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, (2010), ECJ, C-135/08. 
Judicial Review of a decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department dated 10 July 
2013, [2014] CSOH 63. 
Karassev and Family v. Finland, [1999], ECtHR, Application no. 31414/96. 
Kuric and others v Slovenia, (2012), ECtHR, Application no. 26828/06. 
Kurt v Turkey [1998], ECtHR, Application No 24276/94. 
Labassee v. France [2014] ECtHR, Application no. 65941/11. 
Mennesson v. France [2014] ECtHR, Application no. 65192/11.  
Moustaquim v Belgium [1991], ECtHR,  No 12313/86. 
MS, AR & FW v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009] EWCA Civ 1310. 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, [2011] ECtHR, Application no. 30696/09. 
Niemietz v Germany, [1992], ECtHR, Application no. 72/1991/324/396. 
Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955] ICJ 1. 
Petropavlovskis v Latvia, [2015], ECtHR, Application no. 44230/06. 
R (MH) v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 1112. 
R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Khadir, [2005] UKHL 39. 
R v Horncastle and others, [2009], UKSC 14. 
Revenko v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 500. 
RT (Zimbabwe) and others (Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2012] UKSC 38. 
Sisojeva et al v Latvia, [2007] ECHR, Application No. 60654/00. 
Slivenko v. Latvia, [2003], ECtHR, Application no. 48321/99. 
Stoke on Trent City Council v B&Q Plc, [1993], ECJ (C-169/91). 
Tekle v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 3064 (Admin). 
 
Treaties and Conventions 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951. 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless persons, 1954. 
Convention of the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961. 
European Convention on Nationality 1997. 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2007. 
 
Domestic Legislation (UK) 
Enforcement instructions and guidance. 2012. 
European Communities Act 1972. 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
Immigration Act 2014. 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
 
 
34 
 
Command Papers (UK) 
Home Office, ‘Asylum data tables immigration statistics April to June 2014’, Vol. 1, AS 05, 
‘Asylum applications and initial decisions for main applicants by sex and country of 
nationality’ in Tables for Immigration Statistics: April to June 2014, [2014].  
Home Office, Asylum Policy Instruction Statelessness and applications for leave to remain, 
(2016). 
Home Office, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (White Paper, CM 3782, 1997). 
House of Lords, House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Treatment of 
Asylum Seekers, (Tenth Report of Session 2006–07), HL Paper 81-I, HC 60-I. 
 
Hansard (UK) 
Brokenshire, J., Written question – 3447, (22 June 2015). 
Leigh, E., HC, Vol 606, Col 1246-8, (4 March 2016). 
Lord Bishop of Newcastle, HL, Vol 693, Col. GC289 (12 July 2007). 
Lord Rees-Mogg, HL, Vol. 639, Col. 279, (09 October 2002). 
Lord Roberts, HL, Vol. 752, Col. 22, (17 March 2014). 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Books 
Agier, M., On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today, (Polity Press, 
2008). 
Arendt, H., The Origins of Totalitarianism, (3rd edn, Allen & Unwin, 1967). 
Blitz, B., and Sawyer, C., Statelessness in the European Union: Displaced, Undocumented, 
Unwanted, (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
Bloch, A., and Solomos, J., Race and Ethnicity in the 21st Century, (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010). 
Carens, J., The Ethics of Immigration, (OUP, 2013). 
Campbell, T., Sarah, A., Stone, A., Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions, 
(OUP, 2003). 
Craig, P., and De Burca, G., EU Law (5th edn, OUP, 2011). 
Greer, S., The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, (Council of Europe Publishing, 2000). 
Margalit, A., The Decent Society, (Harvard University Press, 1998). 
Mill, J.S., On Liberty, (Batoche Books, 2001). 
Morrison, J., The Trafﬁcking and Smuggling of Asylum-Seekers: The End Game in European 
Asylum Policy?, (2000, UNHCR). 
Olson, M., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, (Harvard 
University Press, 1965). 
Said, E., Orientalism, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). 
Walzer, M., Spheres of Justice, (Basic Books, 1983). 
Weis, P., Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, (Kluwer Academic Publishers 
Group,1979). 
Willis- Esqueda, C., Motivational Aspects of Prejudice and Racism, (Springer, 2008). 
 
Journals 
Bialosky, J., ‘Regional Protection of the Right to a Nationality’, (2015), Cardozo Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, Vol. 24, 153. 
Cagaptay, S., ‘The Impact of Syria’s Refugees on Southern Turkey’, (2014), The Washington 
institute for near east Policy, Policy Focus (130), 1. 
35 
 
 
De Groota, R., and Vonk, O., ‘Nationality, Statelessness and ECHR's Article 8: Comments on 
Genovese v. Malta’, (2012), European Journal of Migration and Law, 14, 317. 
Fancott, N., and York, S., ‘Enforced destitution: impediments to return and access section 4 
"hard cases" support’, (2008), Journal of Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law, 22 (1), 5. 
Gibney, M., ‘Precarious Residents: Migration Control, Membership and the Rights of Non-
Citizens’, (2009), Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 19190, 1. 
Gibney, M., ‘Who should be included? Non-citizens, conflict and the constitution of the 
citizenry’ (2006), CRISE, Working Paper no. 17, 1. 
Gilbert, A., and Koser, K., ‘Coming to the UK: What do Asylum Seekers know about the UK 
before arrival?’, (2006), Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 32, No. 7, 1209. 
Harvey, A. ‘Statelessness: The ‘de facto’ Statelessness Debate’, (2010), Immigration, Asylum 
and Nationality Law, Vol. 24, No 3, 257 
Helmersen, S., ‘Evolutive treaty interpretation: Legality, Semantics and Distinctions’, (2013), 
European Journal of Legal Studies, 6, 127. 
Huneeus, A., ‘Reforming the State from Afar: Structural Reform Litigation at the Human 
Rights Courts’, (2015), The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, 1. 
Hynes, P., and Sales, R., ‘New Communities: Asylum Seekers and Dispersal’, in Bloch, A., 
and Solomos, J., (eds.), Race and Ethnicity in the 21st Century, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 
39. 
Jennings, R., ‘Some International Law Aspects of the Refugee Question’, (1939), British Year 
Book of International Law, Vol. 20, 98. 
Jenkins, R., ‘Categorization: Identity, Social Process and Epistemology’, Current Sociology, 
(2000), Vol. 48, No. 7, 7. 
Kavanagh, A., ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under the Human 
Rights Act 1998’, (2004) 24, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 259. 
Kerber, L., ‘Toward a History of Statelessness in America’, (2005), American Quarterly 
Review, 57, 727. 
Kesby, A., ‘The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law’ Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, (2007), 27, 101. 
Kesby, A., ‘Internal borders and immigration control: new prospects and challenges’, 
European Human Rights Law Review, (2010), 2, 176. 
Kochenov, D., ‘The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification’, 
(2013) European Law Journal, Vol.19(4), 502. 
Mikelsone, G., ‘The Binding force of the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’, (2013), Jurisprudence, 20(2), 469. 
Miller, D., ‘Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship’, (2008), Journal of Political Philosophy, 
Vol.16(4), 371. 
Padilla, A., ‘Social Cognition, Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Specification Strategies for coping 
with threat due to Prejudice and Discrimination’, in Willis- Esqueda, C., (ed.), Motivational 
Aspects of Prejudice and Racism, (Springer, 2008), pp.7-42. 
Parekh, S., ‘Beyond the ethics of admission: Stateless people, refugee camps and moral 
obligations’, (2014), Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 40(7) 645. 
Ronen, Y., ‘The ties that bind: family and private life as bars to the deportation of immigrants’, 
(2012), International Journal of Law in Context, 8(2), 283. 
Runge, C., ‘Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action’, 
(1984), The Journal of Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1, 154. 
Sales, P., ‘Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the Human Rights Act: A response to Lord Irvine’, 
(2012) Public Law, Vol. 2, 253. 
36 
 
Sales, R., ‘The deserving and undeserving? Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Welfare in Britain’, 
(2002), Critical Social Policy, Vol. 22, 456. 
Sweeney, J., ‘The Human Rights of Failed Asylum Seekers in the United Kingdom’, (2008), 
Public Law, 277 
Thym, D., ‘Respect for private and family life under article 8 ECHR in immigration cases: a 
human right to regularize illegal stay?’, (2008), International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 
57(1), 87. 
Tsakyrakis, S., ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009), International Journal 
of Constitutional Law, 7:3, 468.  
Weissbrodt, D., and Collins, C., ‘The Human Rights of Stateless Persons’, (2006), Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1, 245. 
Van Waas, L., ‘Fighting statelessness and discriminatory nationality law in Europe’, (2012), 
European Journal of Migration and Law, 14(3) 243. 
Vlieks, C., A European Human Rights Obligation for Statelessness Determination?, (2013), 
Master’s thesis, Tilburg Law School. 
 
International Organisations  
UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, (2005), 
http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/nationality_en.pdf p. 20. 
UNHCR, Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Status of Stateless Persons, 
(1954), 
http://www.ehu.eus/ceinik/tratados%5C16TRATADOSSOBREREFUGIADOS%5C161Refu
giadosApatridasyAsilo%5CTR1615ING.pdf  accessed 05 March 2016. 
UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of 
stateless persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva, (January 
1999), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b3350.pdf   
 
Online materials 
Black. R., et al, ‘Understanding voluntary return’, (2004), Home Office, Online Report 50/04, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110220105210/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs0
4/rdsolr5004.pdf accessed 15 April 2016. 
Blinder, S., ‘UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern’, 
(2015), The Migration Observatory, 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Public%20Opinion-
Overall%20Attitudes%20and%20Level%20of%20Concern.pdf accessed 22 March 2016. 
BME National and the Chartered Institute of Housing, ‘Advising people who are destitute’, 
Housing Rights, http://www.housing-rights.info/advising-people-who-are-
destitute.php#social-care accessed 24 March 2016. 
British Red Cross, Not gone, but forgotten: The urgent need for a more humane asylum system, 
(2010), http://www.redcross.org.uk/About-us/Our-advocacy-
work/~/media/BritishRedCross/Documents/About%20us/Not%20gone%20but%20forgotten
%20destitution%20report.pdf accessed 09 April 2016. 
Carrion, D., ‘Syrian Refugees in Jordan Confronting Difficult Truths’ (2015), Chatham House, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150921Syria
nRefugeesCarrion.pdf accessed 28 April 2016.  
Conservative Party, The Conservative Party Manifesto, (2015), https://s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf accessed 15 April 2015. 
Crawley, H., Hemmings J., and Price, N., ‘Coping with Destitution Survival and livelihood 
strategies of refused asylum seekers living in the UK’, Centre for Migration Policy Research 
(CMPR), Swansea University (2011), 
37 
 
https://stillhumanstillhere.files.wordpress.com/2009/01/oxfam_coping_with_destitution.pdf   
accessed 05 March 2016. 
Crawley, H., ‘Chance or choice? Understanding why asylum seekers come to the UK’, (2010), 
Refugee Council, http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0001/5702/rcchance.pdf 
accessed29 April 2016. 
Dumper, H., Malfait, R., and Scott-Flynn, N., ‘Destitution and Asylum-Seekers: A study of 
destitute asylum-seekers in the dispersal areas of the South East of England’, (2006), Care 
Services Improvement Partnership, https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/CSIP%20-
%20Mental%20health%20destitution%20and%20asylum-seekers.pdf accessed 15 April 2016.  
European Commission, ‘Summary of  C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, judgment 
of 2 March 2010’, (2010), Summaries of Important Judgements, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/arrets/08c135_en.pdf accessed 15April 2016. 
European Migration Network and European Commission, Ad-Hoc Query on recognition of 
stateless persons, Requested by LU EMN NCP on 26th February 2015, Compilation of 4th 
May 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-queries/ad-hoc-queries-
2015.675_lu_recognition_of_stateless_persons_wider_diss.pdf  accessed 05 March 2016. 
European Network on Statelessness, Kuric and Others v. Slovenia (2012), (June 2012),  
http://www.statelessness.eu/resources/kuric-and-others-v-slovenia-2012  accessed 18 April 
2016. 
Goodwin-Gill, G.,  ‘Deprivation of Citizenship resulting in Statelessness and its Implications 
in International Law’, Opinion, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1086878/guy-s-
goodwin-gill-legal-opinion-on-deprivation.pdf accessed 15 April 2016. 
Gower, M., ‘Asylum support': accommodation and financial support for asylum seekers’, 
(2015), House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, Number 1909, 
file:///C:/Users/Nick/Downloads/SN01909%20(1).pdf accessed 15 April 2016. 
Gower, M., ‘Should asylum seekers have unrestricted rights to work in the UK?’, (2016), 
House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, No. 1908, 
file:///C:/Users/Nick/Downloads/SN01908.pdf accessed 15 April 2016. 
Gov.uk, Return home voluntarily if you're in the UK illegally, https://www.gov.uk/return-
home-voluntarily/who-can-get-help accessed 15 April 2016. 
Giuntella, O., Nicodemo, C., and Vargas-Silva, C., ‘Immigration may reduce the time you wait 
to see the doctor’, (October 13th 2015), London School of Economics, blog, 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/immigration-may-reduce-the-time-you-wait-to-see-
the-doctor/#Authors accessed 28 April 2016. 
Fiss, O., ‘The Immigrant as Pariah’, (1October 1998), Boston Review, 
http://bostonreview.net/forum/owen-fiss-immigrant-pariah accessed 29 April 2016. 
Flamini, R., ‘Judicial Reach: The Ever-Expanding European Court of Justice’, (12 November 
2012), World Affairs, Winter Edition, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/judicial-
reach-ever-expanding-european-court-justice accessed 25 March 2016. 
Hagen-Zanker, J., and Millet, R., ‘Can deterrent policies stop people coming to Europe?’, (23 
March, 2016), The Brooker, http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Inclusive-Economy-
Europe/Can-deterrent-policies-stop-people-coming-to-Europe accessed 29 April 2016. 
International Law Commission, Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries, (2006), 
A/61/10, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_8_2006.pdf 
accessed 03 March 2016.  
International Rescue Committee, Economic Impacts of Syrian Refugees: Existing Research 
Review and Key Takeaways (2015), http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-
file/IRC%20Policy%20Brief%20Economic%20Impacts%20of%20Syrian%20Refugees%20.
pdf accessed 25 April 2016. 
38 
 
Köhn, S., ‘ECHR and citizenship: The case of Genovese v. Malta’, (11 October 2011), 
European Network on Statelessness, Blog, http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/echr-and-
citizenship-case-genovese-v-malta accessed 24 March 2016. 
Leicester Refugee and Asylum Seekers Voluntary Sector Forum, Destitution in the asylum 
system in Leicester, (2009), 
https://stillhumanstillhere.files.wordpress.com/2009/06/destitutionintheasylumsystem.pdf  
accessed 09 April 2016. 
Lewis, H., ‘Still destitute: A worsening problem for refused asylum seekers’, (2009), Joseph 
Rowntree Trust, 
http://www.jrct.org.uk/userfiles/documents/Still%20destitute%20(2009%20full%20research
%20report).pdf  accessed 29 April 2016. 
Local Government Organisation , Immigration Bill Second Reading, House of Commons, (13 
October 2013), 
http://www.local.gov.uk/documents/10180/5533246/131015+Immigration+Bill+-+HC+-
+Second+Reading.pdf/31b74734-59f5-49a5-a8d1-457eabef2513 accessed 29 April 2016. 
Lord Dyson, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Now on a Firmer Footing, But is it a Sound One?’ (30 January 2014), University of Essex, 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lord-dyson-
speech-extraterritorial-reach-echr-300114.pdf  accessed 14 April 2016. 
Lord Irvine, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’, Bingham Centre for the Rule of 
Law, (14th December 2011), UCL Judicial Institute < http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-
institute/files/British_Interpretation_of_Convention_Rights_-_Irvine.pdf> accessed 22 March 
2016. 
Marsi, S., and Srour, I., ‘Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their 
employment profile 2013’ (2014), International Labour Organisation, 
http://www.voced.edu.au/content/ngv%3A70465 accessed 28 April 2016. 
Massey, H., ‘UNHCR and de facto statelessness’, (2010), Legal and Protection Policy 
Research Series, LPPR/2010/01, http://www.unhcr.org/4bc2ddeb9.html   accessed 05 March 
2016. 
May, T., ‘A Beacon of Hope’, Conservatives, 6th October 2015, 
http://press.conservatives.com/post/130940020830/theresa-may-speech-a-beacon-of-hope  
accessed 15 April 2016.  
May, T., ‘Home Secretary Theresa May on counter-terrorism,’ Royal United Services Institute, 
Whitehall, London, 24th Nov 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-
secretary-theresa-may-on-counter-terrorism   accessed 05 March 2016. 
Milanovic, M., ‘The ICJ and Evolutionary Treaty Interpretation’, (2009), EJIL: Talk!, 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icj-and-evolutionary-treaty-interpretation/ accessed 11 April 2016. 
NatCen, British Social Attitudes 2013: Attitudes to immigration, (2013), 
http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/38108/immigration-bsa31.pdf, accessed25 April 2016. 
Refugee Council, Report shows the contribution asylum seekers make to the economy, (15 June 
2005), 
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/707_report_shows_the_contribution_asylum_s
eekers_make_to_the_economy accessed 29 April 2016. 
Richardson, J., ‘Why the lack of adequate social housing in the UK is an important issue and 
how it may be solved’, (7th October 2013), London School of Economics, blog, 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/36783/ accessed 29 April 2016. 
Robinson, N., ‘Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation’, (1955), UNHCR, Geneva, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4785f03d2.pdf  
accessed 05 March 2016. 
39 
 
Salford City Council, Asylum seekers: some myths and truths..., (1 October 2015), Support and 
advice,  https://www.salford.gov.uk/asylum-myths.htm  accessed 24 March 2016. 
Solana, J., ‘Securing Peace in Europe’, NATO, 12 Nov. 1998, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981112a.htm accessed 03 March 2016. 
Still Human still Here, Briefing paper on destitute refused asylum seekers, (2009), Resources, 
https://stillhumanstillhere.wordpress.com/resources/  accessed 25 March 2015. 
The Equal Rights Trust, Legal Working Paper: The Protection of Stateless Persons in 
Detention under International Law, (2009), Project “Stateless Persons in Detention”, 
http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/ERT%20Legal%20Working%20Paper.pdf
accessed 05 March 2016.  
Van Waas, L., ‘Rottmann and Genovese: How will Europe’s nationality laws stand up to the 
scrutiny of its regional courts?’, (12 March 2012), Tilberg University, Weblog Stateless 
programme,  http://statelessprog.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/rottmann-and-genovese-how-will-
europes.html accessed 24 March 2016. 
Wright, W., ‘Hannah Arendt and Enemy Combatants: New Implications of Statelessness.’ 
(2008), Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 
http://research.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/3/8/0/5/p138056_index.
html  accessed 15 March 2016. 
 
Newspapers 
Sheldrick, G., ‘Asylum bill hits £726,000 a day: Immigration policy is a 'shambles' say critics’, 
(March 2 2015), The Express, http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/561302/Asylum-seekers-
cost-taxpayers-726k-day-immigration accessed 29 April 2016. 
The Economist, Boon or burden?, (June 15th 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-
and-economics/21579482-new-study-shows-fiscal-impact-migration-broadly-neutral-boon-or  
accessed 28 April 2016. 
Travis, A., ‘Theresa May criticised for 'compassion quota' in asylum strategy’, (27 February 
2016), Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/feb/27/theresa-may-criticised-
for-compassion-quota-in-asylum-strategy accessed 15 April 2016. 
   
